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Rhetorical Counterinsurgency: 
The FBI and the American Indian Movement 
 
 
Casey Ryan Kelly 
 
University of Minnesota, Twin Cities 
 
In 2007, Federal Bureau of Investigation agents Joseph H. and John M. Trimbach published 
a tell-all book to expose the crimes of American Indian Movement (AIM) and dispel con-
temporary myths about Bureau conspiracies against Indian activists. The book provides 
an insiders’ account of the agents’ participation in the investigation of AIM and attempts 
to correct what they characterize as popular revisionist history accusing the FBI of gross 
injustices against Indian Country. The agents argue that as far as AIM is concerned, in the 
halls of academia, “There is a market for blurring the historical lines between fact and fic-
tion” (2007, 6). While the book is cavalier, polemical, and one-sided, I take seriously their 
argument for scholars to revisit this controversy and place the FBI’s investigation of AIM 
within its proper historical context. In their effort to exonerate the FBI, however, they ac-
cuse AIM and its apologists of distorting the true historical record. In doing so, the agents 
dismiss any suggestion that the FBI participated in the social construction of that history. 
Allen Megell and Deirdre M. McCloskey suggest, however, that history does not exist out-
side of discourse but rather “is concerned with tropes, arguments, and other devices of 
language used to write history and to persuade audiences” (1987, 221). Obsessed with the 
objective fact of AIM’s alleged terrorist activities, the agents seem to dismiss that the Bu-
reau’s rhetorical activity was, at times, nothing more than poor word choices. In this essay, 
however, I argue that the FBI’s language was central to its approach, both in terms of the 
communicative techniques used to defuse AIM as well as the topoi leveraged to rationalize 
extreme measures in defense of national interests. In revisiting the justifications for emer-
gency measures against AIM, I situate the FBI’s rhetoric within a cultural context of limited 
K E L L Y ,  A D V A N C E S  I N  T H E  H I S T O R Y  O F  R H E T O R I C  1 0  (2 0 0 7 )  
2 
intellectual resources to comprehend radical Indian activism. The FBI utilized communi-
cative techniques that marshaled this limited cultural knowledge as a method of move-
ment suppression. I argue that the rhetoric of the FBI’s investigation of AIM from 1971 to 
1976 illuminates the contours of what I term rhetorical counterinsurgency. 
As first explicated by US Army Special Forces in 1960 and adapted domestically by the 
FBI’s counterintelligence bureau (COINTELPRO), counterinsurgency operations included 
unconventional military and nonmilitary activities to disrupt and destroy dissident move-
ments, guerilla organizations, and general revolutionary activity. Such operations included 
direct intervention into media institutions to conduct psychological warfare, information 
warfare, propaganda, and disinformation. Counterinsurgency operations required an ad-
vanced strategic understanding of how communicative practices can be marshaled to secure 
government interests and win the hearts and minds of the public. Rhetorical counterinsur-
gency constitutes a systematic and strategic set of communicative techniques or instru-
ments which, when used in combination, manage, dissipate, and suppress radicalism. 
Building on the concept of rhetorical exclusion developed by John Sanchez, Mary Stuckey, 
and Richard Morris (1999), I situate such communicative practices that work in the inter-
ests of the state against those of popular movements as a part of modern governance. 
Ronald W. Greene argues that rhetorical practices thought of as technologies of govern-
ance enable the management of “a population, space, and/or object by articulating an en-
semble of human technologies into a function network of power to improve public 
welfare” (1998, 2). 
While social movement scholarship is strong on the material methods by which those 
in power thwart revolutionary and subversive activity, more work needs to be done to 
explore the inner workings of rhetorical practices that provide interpretative guidance to 
discredit the symbolic and argumentative justifications for social protest. To contribute to 
this theoretical work, I argue that rhetorical counterinsurgency is reflexive and epistemic. 
It affects the approach of the individuals and institutions who wield it as technique of con-
trol while it reproduces narrow intellectual interpretations of social protest messages. 
This essay unfolds in three sections. First, I develop a theory of rhetorical counterinsur-
gency and explain its refinement within the FBI as a method of threat control and manage-
ment. Second, I situate rhetorical counterinsurgency within a series of migrating cultural 
contexts, including the Cold War, the Vietnam War, and cultural stereotypes of American 
Indians. These contexts constrained the available interpretations of Indian as well as non-
Indian radicalism and justified the application of techniques of counterinsurgency. Finally, 
I offer a rhetorical analysis of both the FBI’s use of communicative tactics as a method of 
counterinsurgency as well as the content of their rhetorical constructions of AIM. I inves-
tigate two disarming topoi of savagery: AIM as communist surrogate and American Viet Cong. 
 
Rhetorical Dimensions of Counterinsurgency 
 
As leveraged against American Indian activism, Sanchez, Stuckey, and Morris explain that 
rhetorical exclusion is (1999, 28) “one strategy used by members of the prevailing power 
structure to conceal any antidemocratic consequences of its actions.” As a strategy of coun-
terinsurgency, rhetorical exclusion is a mechanism by which institutional structures of 
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power mobilize definitions, images, and other symbolic activities to diffuse challenges to 
its legitimacy while concealing its own repressive tactics. Mark Meister and Ann Burnett 
extend the concept of rhetorical exclusion by showing how language strategies, particu-
larly at work in the trial transcript of United States v. Leonard Peltier, were a part of a strate-
gic order to “interpret the social order so that power is legitimized” (2004, 723). Similar to 
rhetorical exclusion, John Murphy and Mary Stuckey (200 1) argue that the colonization in 
North America was largely a rhetorical process that primed people and land for colonial 
violence. Furthermore, focusing on its roots in early American iconography, rhetorical 
critic Jeremy Engels connects the rhetorical maneuvers of colonizing discourses to demon-
strate the “relationship between violence, nation-building, rhetorical invention, and the 
colonization of Native Americans” (2005, 2). Anthropologist Jeanette Haynes Writer (2002) 
even contends that such rhetorical strategies sanctioned wholesale violence in such a way 
as to constitute a form of state-sponsored terrorism against American Indians. These works 
in rhetorical studies, as well as a great many in American Indian studies, demonstrate a 
connection between violence against American Indians and the rhetorical practices of col-
onizing institutions. 
While rhetorical counterinsurgency is an intentional practice directed to dissipate 
threatening and subversive social movements, I do not argue that there was a vast conspir-
acy against the American Indian Movement. I merely suggest that there is a connection 
between the uptake of the FBI’s narrative of AIM violence and the resources available for 
public interpretation of their message and goals. I seek to extend the theoretical relation-
ship between rhetoric, governmentality, and the suppression of social movements by ex-
amining the consequences of the FBI’s rhetorical construction of AIM. The rhetorical 
dimensions of FBI investigations are a useful site at which to explore this relationship be-
cause of its role as both an information gathering and information producing agency. 
While the agency may not have intended malice, the FBI’s surveillance projects had conse-
quences for the possible interpretations of American Indian rhetoric and political activism 
on all fronts, legitimate or criminal. 
In the Rhetoric of Agitation and Control, John Bowers, Donavan Ochs, and Richard Jensen 
(1993) argue that the “rhetorical stance” taken by the establishment against threatening 
social activism is plagued by the constraints of governmentality and social management 
(47). 
 
The decision makers must show that their ability to manage, guide, direct, and 
enhance the group is greater than that of other members in the group. Rhetoric 
plays an important role in maintaining decision makers in their position of 
power. . . . One principle governs that rhetorical stance taken by any establish-
ment: Decision makers must assume that the worst will happen in a given instance of 
agitation. The corollary to that principle is equally important: Decision makers must 
be prepared to repel any attack on the establishment. 
 
When agencies charged with law enforcement encounter radical social movements, they 
are likely to apply an interpretive framework of criminality and deviance to their behavior 
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and prepare against worst-case scenarios. One important avenue for such preparations in-
volves public performances of law enforcement readiness. The public image of an estab-
lishment as exercising judicious and legitimate countermeasures against subversion is a 
fundamental component of diffusing radical agitation. It controls public sympathies and 
positively frames the role of law enforcement. In addition to the discharge of their duties 
in relation to criminal investigations, law enforcement agencies participate in rhetorical 
activities that shape possible interpretations of their activities when confrontations become 
matters of public record. Garth Jowett and Victoria O’ Donnell suggest that these (2006, xi) 
“techniques may range over a wide array of symbolic or physical acts, but the central and 
simple purpose is to alter and manipulate public attitudes, perceptions, and ultimately 
behavior in such a way as to benefit those employing such techniques.” As Bowers, Ochs, 
and Jensen suggest, suppression strategies require rhetorical to discredit the movement’s 
message in order to “stop the spread of that ideology by hindering the goals and personnel 
of the agitative movement” (54). 
Law enforcement framing that conceives of radical protest as a confrontation with in-
surgent forces can be a self-fulfilling prophecy, likely to criminalize social movement be-
havior in a process of asymmetrical escalation to eliminate the threat, real or perceived. 
While rhetorical counterinsurgency is not a conspiratorial enterprise, the consequences can 
disarm valuable social messages, reinforce state power, create the conditions for violent 
confrontation, and demonize social movements. This conclusion is particularly salient in 
the case of American Indian dissent because of their vast cultural difference from main-
stream non-Indian society and history of direct military conflict with the US government. 
Craig Smith, Rasmussen, and Makela argue that their analysis of government suppression 
strategies against American Indians reveals “clearly the manner in which a Eurocentric 
culture responds to an alien one” (1996, 82). Put differently, the vast cultural gap between 
activist agitating for the return of Indian lands and the interests of Euro-American institu-
tions magnified law enforcement’s perception of AIM’s growth as dangerous. 
As a general phenomenon, when marshaled in the defense of state interests against so-
called subversive activity, practices of rhetorical exclusion and rhetorical colonialism con-
stitute techniques of governance whereby the state embeds populations, discourses, and 
social institutions in an economy of knowledge, power, and meaning. As opposed to the 
ancient juridical mode in which power was exercised through the raw visible spectacle of 
sovereign violence, power is most efficiently exercised through the discursive practices 
that arrange ideas, signs, and meanings in specific configurations that then enable partic-
ular applications of state interests to the management of populations. Michel Foucault ex-
plains (1977, 102): 
 
This discourse provided, by means of the theory of interests, representations and 
signs, by the series and geneses that it reconstituted, a sort of general recipe for 
the exercise of power over men [sic]: the “mind” as a surface inscription of 
power, with semiology as its tool the submission of bodies through the control 
of ideas; the analysis of representations as a principle in a politics of bodies that 
was much more effective than the ritual anatomy of torture and execution. 
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While the direct application of violence to the body had once served as a primary method 
of state control, it was the metamorphosis of punitive justice into a ubiquitous strategy of 
normalization, regimentation, and management that sustained the existing social order. 
While force is still a political fact of governmentality, it is the ability of the state apparatus 
to control the interpretation of social violence that enables the effective administration of 
both overt and covert punitive practices. While Foucault is concerned with the diffusion 
of such practices into the social body, it is important that critics not lose sight of the rhe-
torical techniques that enable particular types of governing relationships in which the di-
rect application of force is made possible, and in some instances inevitable. For the 
purposes of this essay, governance or governmentality is defined by a set of rhetorical 
techniques that enable particular types of control not necessarily a singular location or in-
stitution. 
Greene extends the relationship between rhetoric and governmentality by arguing that 
“rhetorical practices stabilize meaning by distributing populations, discourses and institu-
tions on the terrain of a governing apparatus so that a series of judgments might be made 
about the art of government” (30). While Greene explains the relationship between rhetoric 
and governance as the unfolding of practical reasoning through deliberation, I apply this 
theoretical understanding to the informal processes of governance that seek to undermine 
the public’s deliberative capacity. Extending Greene’s observation that rhetorical practices 
help calibrate governing apparatuses, I argue that rhetorical counterinsurgency extends 
governmental administration by fine-tuning mediated networks of public discourse, often 
through disinformation, counterintelligence, and propaganda, to produce ideological in-
terpretations of threats to the existing order and responses to those threats. This is accom-
plished through the controlled production and circulation of knowledge about dissident 
populations. Such practices are sustained through the circulation of information and its 
recirculation through government bureaucracy and mass-media sources. 
Through surveillance, agent provocateurs, and amassing intelligence about subversive 
organizations, law enforcement agencies achieve totally mastery over information. The 
subsequent bureaucratic analysis of intelligence data and its recirculation through media 
sources for public consumption completes a feedback loop where intelligence is turned 
into a carefully crafted strategy to shape public memory about government and movement 
activities. The process of informing and intelligence gathering is a generative moment for 
the rhetoric of counterinsurgency. In his probative work on the operations the FBI’s Coun-
terintelligence Bureau (COINTELPRO), Nelson Blackstone argues that (1975, xi) “Inform-
ers don’t just passively take notes. They act. And they act out of their loyalty to the FBI, 
not to the political group. Therefore, informers interfere with the freedom of speech and 
association of those members who have the best interests of the organization at heart.” 
Completing the functions of governmentality, informing, gathering intelligence, and sur-
veillance are deployed to articulate interested knowledge about targeted populations. In-
formation circulation has a synergistic effect of continually calibrating the mechanisms of 
state repression and control. Foucault explains that these techniques produce “compulsory 
visibility” whereby subjects are rendered visible, knowable, and pliable to the exercise of 
power while the mechanisms of such power are made invisible (187). In the case of ad-
dressing threats and suppressing dissent, the production of knowledge about threatening 
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movement activities mystifies the inner workings of power by rendering techniques of the 
FBI increasingly difficult to identify. The FBI’s construction of AIM as an insurgent guer-
rilla terrorist organization with communist ties obscured any rationale for their activity, 
decontextualized their use of force, and justified extreme responses to their agitation. 
 
Migrating Contexts of Insurgency 
 
The FBI’s rhetorical construction of AIM marshaled easily identifiable discourses concern-
ing political violence, both international and domestic, to offer interpretations of their rad-
ical agitation and justify extreme measure of repression. Topoi of insurgency, communist 
infiltration, and guerrilla warfare drew from the culturally available explanations of threats 
to the existing order that emerged in the 1960s and 1970s. Cold War critic Robert Ivie char-
acterizes such topoi as the culturally available assumptions or resources of invention rhe-
tors use to ( 1980, 282) “generate a number of specific statements that serve as premises, 
warrants, or points of identification in support of predetermined claims.” Multiple over-
lapping historical contexts illuminate the cultural topoi available to discuss radical Amer-
ican Indian activism and the FBI’s choices to invent and contain their agitation from 1971 
to 1976. First, the looming specter of Viet Cong guerrilla warfare in Vietnam and the Cold 
War political culture obsessed with containing the ubiquitous and amorphous threat of 
communist infiltration provided a readily available lexicon of threat assessment, construc-
tion, and response. Radical protest organizations that articulated subversive political cri-
tiques of American imperialism and advocated confrontation and resistance (such as the 
AIM, the Black Panther Party, Students for a Democratic Society, the New Left, and a litany 
of other groups) fell under the purview of the FBI’s COINTELPRO program and associated 
surveillance programs. As Sociologist David Cunningham explains, FBI counterintelli-
gence programs were designed to (2003, 329) “expose, disrupt, misdirect, discredit, or oth-
erwise neutralize the activities of protest groups and individual ‘key activists’ that, in their 
view, engaged in actions that threatened the security of the US government.” Historian 
James Davis (1997) compiles evidence that these operations were honed first against radi-
cal organizations of the political left and right: the American Communist Party, the Social-
ist Workers Party, and the Ku Klux Klan. In his systematic analysis of the use and purpose 
of the FBI’s counterintelligence programs against the New Left, Cunningham argues that 
the counterintelligence program were dangerous because they blurred the line between 
foreign and domestic enemies and between protest and national security threats (2003b, 
234): 
 
The history of the organization, especially under J. Edgar Hoover but in some 
important ways today as well, shows a consistent pattern of defining abstract 
threats (whether they be from anarchists, communists, or terrorists) that are then 
found and dealt with in an often self-fulfilling manner. The larger purposes of 
such activity, beyond the preservation of national security, have undoubtedly 
included self-aggrandizement and securing ever-increasing budgetary alloca-
tions (Donner 1980; Powers 1987). 
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The FBI’s rhetoric concerning social movement activism tended to reduce the motives for 
agitation to either communism or terrorism. Their inability to distinguish protest from do-
mestic insurgency was connected to circulating discourse about the ambiguous nature of 
threats to American power. These discourses solidified prior to the full-scale development 
of FBI counterintelligence; from the end of World War II through the height of the McCarthy-
era in 1955. Director J. Edgar Hoover argued that it was his organization’s charge to expose 
“a force of traitorous communists, constantly gnawing away like termites at the very foun-
dations of American society” (Hoover 1950, quoted in Grossman 1995, par. 31). Hoover’s 
dubious construction of communism itself was, at best, an empty signifier and at worst 
and misleading label for all perceived threats to national security. Anti-war movement 
historian Tom Wells suggests that (1994, 4) “officials attributed the wellsprings of dissent 
more to emotionalism, character flaws, and sinister external forces than reasoned judg-
ment. Indeed, both Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon, and many of their aides, were 
convinced that foreign communists were behind the dissent.” Furthermore, Fredrik Logevall 
suggests that regardless of the public reception of such messages about the nature of com-
munism and domestic insurgency, “those on the left who might have put forth an alterna-
tive vision no longer had cultural or political approval. Those on the right had the field 
largely to themselves” (2001, 82). As Hoover suggests, the communist threat was perceived 
by the FBI and other law enforcement organizations as foreign and domestic, a fifth col-
umn threatening to collapse America from within through partisan resistance. The threat 
was not only from the Moscow and Peking, but from the collective strength of “termi-
nates,” small infestations taking a variety of forms from guerilla warriors in Vietnam to 
subversive radicals within the United States. As I argue later in the analysis, while the FBI 
concern about AIM was also connected to their militant demand for the return of Indian 
lands, they also express paranoia that Indian activists are linked to communist organiza-
tions within and outside of the country. 
The military context of the Vietnam War is essential to understand the FBI’s rhetorical 
construction of AIM. The tactics and topoi used to construct and confront the communist 
threat in Vietnam migrated into the domestic public sphere. First, in addition to the amor-
phous specter of communism, communication historian Christopher Simpson (1994) argues 
that the concept of “world view warfare,” psychological and ideological indoctrination, 
emerges from collaboration between the US military and applied researchers in mass com-
munication. Simpson argues that during World War II, worldview warfare techniques 
were used to immunize immigrant populations against Soviet and Axis propaganda. Sim-
ultaneously, during the Kennedy Administration, the U.S Special Forces were formed to 
developed new military strategies and war-fighting doctrines to deal with subnational, 
guerrilla, or insurgent military forces (Marquis 1997). The concept of counterinsurgency 
first appeared in the US Army Special Forces manual titled Counter-Insurgency Operations 
in 1960 (McClintock 1992). Given that insurgent or paramilitary forces could camouflage 
as and within civilian populations, counterinsurgency operations relied on subtle yet con-
fusing distinctions between military and civilian targets. Counterinsurgency tactics were 
used against the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese forces because of their ability to conceal 
guerilla activity within humble natural landscapes and everyday village life. Counterin-
surgency operations during the Vietnam War aimed to eliminate the natural advantage of 
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a popular insurgent force through a variety of tactics designed to undermine their human 
resource based including, but not limited to, the use of chemical defoliants to erode the 
Viet Cong’s environmental resources and indirect training and support of South Vietnamese 
paramilitary forces (Nagl 2002). Simpson argues that counterinsurgency and worldview 
warfare operations also expanded to include economic development projects “to win the 
hearts and minds of Vietnam’s peasant population through propaganda, creation of ‘stra-
tegic hamlets,’ and similar forms of controlled social development under the umbrella of 
US Special Forces troops” (84). 
While not directly causal, the simultaneous emergence of foreign and domestic coun-
terinsurgency operations demonstrates the development of a situated vocabulary, and cor-
ollary approach and attitude, toward radical organizations in the United States and abroad. 
As Simpson’s work suggests, the research that emerges from academic institutions on 
propaganda, worldview warfare, and counterinsurgency provided the US government 
with a range of proven tactics to combat emerging threats to national security. These tactics 
were also communicative, rhetorical, and ideological. The findings of counterinsurgency 
research provided lessons for modern warfare that had dire consequences for radical or-
ganizations in the United States. Modern warfare was constructed as unconventional. It 
took place in nontraditional settings and required combat in civilian settings, always in an 
ideological struggle for hearts and minds. 
Finally, the social and discursive context of conquering new frontiers in Vietnam had 
profound implications for American Indian activism in particular. The application and cir-
culation of Indian Country and frontier metaphors to describe the conflict-zone in Vietnam 
reanimated the topoi of savagery used by the US military in the previous century to combat 
Indian violence and guerrilla resistance on the frontier. Literary critic David Espey (1994) 
argues the American Indian subtext to military perceptions of the Viet Cong, along with 
popular representations of the Vietnam War in film and literature, created strong parallels 
between the mythology of the American frontier and rationalizations for brutality against 
the North Vietnamese (par. 1): 
 
Among the many changes in American culture influenced by the Vietnam War 
in the years 1968–75 were transformations in the popular image of the American 
Indian and in Native American political consciousness. Vietnam and the Indians 
share a curious association in the American imagination. In the early years of the 
war, the United States often thought of Vietnam in images of the American West 
and cast the Vietnamese in the role of Indians. 
 
Military commanders and soldiers invoked the mythical Euro-American lexicon of Indian 
Country to describe the untamed wilderness of Vietnam and the savagery of the North 
Vietnamese. Espey traces the frontier theme through the official rhetoric of the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff and the expressions of on-the-ground Vietnam veterans to uncover how the im-
agery of Indian savagery pervaded their orientation toward the Vietnamese. In the eyes of 
the US military, the tactics of guerilla warfare employed by the Viet Cong bared similar 
markers to those experienced by the US cavalry in the nineteenth century (Slotkin 1973; 
Drinnon 1997). In his book Chasing Ghosts: Unconventional Warfare in American History, John 
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Tierny (2007) explains that military confrontation with Seminoles, the Sioux, and the Nav-
ajo, often resulting in massacres, were their earliest and most haunting encounters with 
guerilla warfare. While tribal resistance tactics were by no means monolithic, Tierny ar-
gues as follows (78): 
 
Yet, there was at least a common denominator between all the tribes and all of 
the centuries. The Indians almost always fought in unorthodox, irregular fash-
ion: their lack of discipline and organization, their stealth and surprise, their dis-
dain for rules or procedures, their dress, their tactics, their attitudes—all of these 
attributes were unorthodox in comparison to either European or US Army train-
ing manuals and battle procedures. Some tribes, moreover, were extremely adept 
at sustained and disciplined guerrilla war, as distinguished from irregular battle 
habits. The Seminoles, the Sioux, and the Navajo were high on the list. But through-
out the long years of Indian warfare the settler had to cope with the type of ad-
versary he could never understand from textbooks. 
 
Indian Country constitutes one of the most powerful topoi available to construct the am-
bivalent mission in Vietnam. To explain the ubiquity and circulation of meanings of guer-
rilla warfare, Espey also demonstrates the uptake of Indian War metaphors in popular 
culture, such as the John Wayne film The Green Beret (1968) in which the Vietnamese speak 
and act like caricatures of Sioux warriors. Espey cites other literary and popular culture 
critics have observed the Indian-Vietnam connection. For example, Phillip Melling (1990) 
identifies strong similarities between the New England Puritan garrison mentality, Indian 
“captivity narratives,” and soldier narratives that construct the profane space of Vietnam-
ese wilderness as iconic of the savagery of Vietnamese guerilla warfare. Furthermore, Mi-
chael Yellow Bird, Director of the Center for Indigenous Nations Studies at the University 
of Kansas, argues that metaphors of cowboys and Indians provided a context for dehu-
manization in Vietnam (2004, 43): 
 
One of the most infamous massacres embodying the cowboys and Indians theme 
was My Lai, where American soldiers murdered as many as five hundred un-
armed civilians—old men, women, and children. A unit of Charlie Company, 
First Battalion, Twentieth Infantry, the soldiers responsible for this slaughter, 
said that My Lai was inevitable because the Viet Cong were regarded as Indians. 
 
While the evidence suggests parallels between the construction of Indian savagery and 
similar types of violence enacted a century later in Vietnam, I seek to bring that context 
back to the domestic politics of radicalism to explain the effectiveness of rhetorical coun-
terinsurgency against American Indian activists. The ways in which images of Viet Cong 
and Indian militants stand in the place of one another demonstrates the resource of inven-
tion available for the US military, the FBI, and other law enforcement agencies embedded 
within constructed scenes of insurgency and counterinsurgency to rationalize their per-
ceived enemy. Enacting counterinsurgency domestically against American Indian radicals 
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reproduced the rhetorical forms and contexts of parallel insurgent environments and ne-
cessitated the application of topoi that rationalized counterinsurgency against a guerrilla 
enemy. Thus, in their enactment of counterinsurgency against AIM, the FBI marshaled 
topoi of communist infiltration, guerrilla enemies, and irrational or unjustified violence. 
While the FBI proceeding against AIM as if this were truly the case, the FBI also utilized 
rhetorical venues to shape the publics interpretation of AIM’s radical and unconventional 
form of agitation. I identify two complementary and sometimes contradictory images of 
AIM: the communist surrogate and the Viet Cong guerrilla. 
 
AIM as Communist 
 
In 1971 the Senate Internal Security Administration released a report titled “The Assault 
on Freedom” of which a large section was devoted to exposing the ties between the Com-
munist Party and the American Indian Movement. The report, referenced for its accuracy 
by the Senate Judiciary committee in 1976, alleged Indian activism was directly connected 
to a world-wide communist revolution (2): 
 
The Communist Party for more than a year now has been both supporting and 
sparkplugging the so-called “American Indian Liberation Movement.” The de-
cision to make the Indian Liberation Movement a major point of emphasis was 
made at a “National Conference of Indian Liberation” convened “somewhere in 
the Western United States” in November 1969 . . . Communist Party Chairman 
Henry Winston keynoted the conference by describing the Indian Liberation 
Movement as “one of the four major national struggles in our country.” 
 
Throughout the organizations ascendance to national prominence, law enforcement searched 
to connect AIM to a broader network of conspiracies including both the US Communist 
Party as well as foreign communist insurgents. The rhetoric of anti-communism served 
three functions. First, however dubious the claim may have been, the link to communism 
highlighted that a force other than Indians was in control of the organization. This enabled 
the FBI to make arguments that AIM did not speak for a majority of American Indians. In 
the 1976 Congressional hearing on Revolutionary Activities within the United States, Senator 
James O. Eastman, argues there was a connection between AIM and the American Com-
munist Party. As a result, real Indians were not in control of AIM. He argues that “the 
record is clear that the elected tribal councils look upon the American Indian Movement 
as a radical and subversive organization” (2). Second, the rhetoric linked Indian activists 
to an omnipresent enemy of Soviet infiltration that reemerged camouflaged as a seemingly 
benign organization. Decades of cultural knowledge about the scourge of communism 
could be easily mapped onto AIM’s rhetoric and activism. This rhetoric reduced the com-
plexity of AIM’s message from a struggle for social justice to a simple plot of communist 
deception. Third, it highlighted the urgency of immediate action to counter the threat, spe-
cifically by the FBI which had taken early propriety over communist investigations and 
counterintelligence in the 1950s. 
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While AIM did express anti-capitalist and anti-imperialist views, their demands were 
more particular than universal. They demanded specific rights in the area of tribal self-
determination: the enforcement of guaranteed treaty rights, elimination of the Bureau of 
Indian Affairs, preservation of an Indian land base, and a return to traditional indigenous 
languages, religions, and lifestyles. American Indian intellectual Vine Deloria humorously 
notes that while (1974, 3) “the New Left welcomed Indian activists at its rallies” such move-
ments were shocked to learn that “Indians were not planning to share the continent with 
their oppressed brothers once the revolution was over.” While AIM shared goals with 
other minority, Third World, and even communist groups, their struggle was specific to 
the Indian experience in North America. Deloria argues that AIM activists understood 
their demands and tactics as a continuation of a deeply historic Indian struggle as opposed 
to being new and derivative. While they were sympathetic to the Marxist critique of Amer-
ican capitalism emerging within the New Left, AIM did not fit because there was no place 
for the return of Indian lands as a collective goal. 
AIM, originally called CIA (Concerned Indians of American), was founded in Minne-
apolis in 1968 by Dennis Banks, Russell Means, Clyde Bellcourt, George Mitchell, and sev-
eral other prominent Indian activists. Similar to the Black Panther Party in Oakland, before 
taking the reins of self-determination, the group served as a watchdog organization to pro-
tect Twin Cities Indians from police harassment and brutality (Smith and Warrior 1996; 
Means 1995). Dennis Banks (2004) notes that most, including him, did an extensive amount 
of time in the state penitentiary because they were too poor to raise bail or hire legal coun-
sel. In his autobiography, Leonard Peltier (1999) humorously refers to the Minnesota state 
penitentiary as the “Indian finishing school” for his generation of AIM activists. AIM mem-
bers organized to report and monitor police abuse, provide legal counsel and raise bail for 
Indian defendants, and unify the Twin Cities American Indian community (92). AIM quickly 
ascended to national prominence as an activist organization in part because of the rising 
ethnic nationalism expressed in the fishing rights protests in Washington State, the occu-
pation of Alcatraz Island, and a series of other occupations at Mt. Rushmore, Pit River, and 
Plymouth Rock (Cobb and Fowler 2007; Johnson 2007; Nagel 1997). AIM chapters quickly 
sprouted in several other US cities. AIM grabbed the attention of law enforcement when 
members occupied the small town of Gordon, Nebraska, in 1972 to protest what they char-
acterized as misconduct in the prosecution of the murder of Oglala ranch hand Raymond 
Yellow Thunder. 
Paul Chaat Smith and Robert Warrior argue that “The initials—A-I-M—underscored all 
of that, creating an active verb rich in power and imagery. You aimed at a target. You could 
aim for victory, for freedom, for justice. You could also, defiantly, never aim to please. 
Written vertically and stylized a bit, the acronym became an arrow” (127). To match their 
militant naming and goals, AIM utilized tactics that were highly confrontational and un-
conventional. The use of occupations, invasion and infiltration of iconic spaces, and sym-
bolic reclamations of land as a form of protest classified AIM one of the more extreme and 
militant organizations of their time. The organization’s occupation of Bureau of Indian Af-
fairs headquarters as a part of “Trail of Broken Treaties” in 1972, suggested the movement 
shared a common goal of exercising their legally guaranteed rights and spoke with a voice 
attuned to pulse of Indian Country. While their tactics may have been controversial within 
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the Indian community, Smith and Warrior note that AIM membership “exploded across 
reservations and cities from North Carolina to the Pacific Northwest during 1972” (138). 
The occupation at Gordon, a result of a plea for help from Yellow Thunder’s mother to 
Dennis Banks and Russell Means, demonstrated that ties were improving between urban 
and reservation Indians. 
While the name, character, and growing strength of the organization indicated that AIM 
represented the views of Indian Country, the rhetoric of anti-communist leveraged by the 
FBI indicated that either the movement’s leaders had betrayed their adherents or com-
munist insurgents were exploiting Indian causes to foment revolution. Either way, the re-
sulting picture was of a small cadre of radicals that did not represent the viewpoints of real 
American Indians. Senator Eastman testifies that “the elected tribal councils speak for the 
masses of the Indian people” (United States 1976, 2). The claim casts doubt on whether 
AIM’s radical tactics and accompanied critique of the BIA and federal Indian law accu-
rately represented the views of American Indians. The Congressional testimony of under-
cover FBI agent Douglas Durham provides a good representative anecdote of the FBI’s 
rhetorical strategy of anti-communism to cast doubt on AIM’s authoritative voice. Durham 
infiltrated AIM from 1973 to 1975 and ascended to the highest levels of the organization 
while collecting what he argues was “considerable information regarding its revolutionary 
activities” (United States 1976, 4). In addition to identifying an ideology of violence and 
guerrilla terrorism, Durham goes to great lengths to emphasize that AIM is a communist 
front organization. He contends that “it appears the American Indian Movement is gaining 
more credibility with Communist-front organizations and becoming more recognized in-
ternationally” (9). Durham argues that the movement used Indian causes as cover for com-
munist revolution. Exposing what he considers a lack of media scrutiny, Durham explains 
that “there is a widespread impression, unfortunately shared by too many people in the 
media, that the American Indian Movement is just simply a reform movement committed 
to creating a better way of life for the American Indian. Nothing could be further from the 
truth” (3). Durham presents documents from other organizations that have been disowned 
by AIM as proof that the true voices that represented Indian Country were not in control. 
Like a proverbial red herring, the notion that communists held the reins of the move-
ment side-stepped the entire question of treaty violations as a legitimate subject of protest. 
Many legal scholars note the federal government’s failure to abide by the nearly 400 trea-
ties signed and ratified through the late nineteenth century (Johansen 2004; Williams 2005; 
Williams 2001; Wilkinson 1987). An even more subtle consequence of communist associa-
tion was that part of justification for war in Vietnam was premised on a US commitment 
to treaty obligations and as a corollary, communist violation of international treaties. As 
President Nixon promised in 1969, in contrast to communist aggressors “the United States 
will keep all of its treaty commitments.” Deloria argues that (1971, 28) “Richard Nixon 
warned the American people that Russia was bad because she had not kept any treaty or 
agreement signed with her. You can trust the Communists, the saying went, to be com-
munists.” The prevailing discourse of Soviet Union treaty violations provided evidence as 
to the moral character of communism and low-lighted America’s own treaty abrogation at 
home. Deloria continues that “it would take Russia another century to make and break as 
many treaties as the United States has already violated” (28). In the context of a protest 
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movement articulating specific demands to enforce Indian treaties, anti-communist rheto-
ric shifted the burden of proof to AIM, standing in the place of all communists, to demon-
strate their trustworthiness. The history of US treaty violations against American Indians 
was overshadowed by the crimes and treaty violations of the Soviet Union and other com-
munist regimes. The central question became the communist moral character, not the de-
gree to which treaty violations against American Indians betray the spirit of democracy. 
Under such circumstances, it would seem unreasonable for the federal government to ne-
gotiate with AIM because communists, much like those in the Kremlin, do not adhere to 
their signed agreements and promises. In fact, communist insurgents and despots only 
understand violence. As the argument goes, only democracies abide by international norms 
and live up to their promises. By shifting the focus from AIM’s criticism of America’s own 
treaty violations to the duplicity of agreements and promises of communist regimes and 
the universal character of communism itself, the rhetoric of anti-communism disarmed 
and diffused legitimate critique. What’s more, the demands for treaty enforcement were 
framed as generating from communists rather than organically emerging from Indian 
Country. Such demands were portrayed as being contrived by communist opportunists to 
contain American power by treaties they themselves have no intention to follow. 
The second and third consequences of anti-communist rhetoric were that it mapped 
conveniently over AIM’s tactics and played on familiar fears and caricatures that provoked 
urgency and extreme action in defense of freedom. AIM was constructed as a fifth column, 
as one of a number of related organizational instruments of foreign communist regimes 
deployed to infiltrate and destabilize the United States in advance of international revolu-
tion. Trimbach and Trimbach, summarizing the 1976 report on AIM argue that “It is a 
frankly revolutionary organization which is committed to violence. . . . Some of AIM’s 
leaders . . . have visited Castro and/or consider themselves Marxist-Leninist” (12). Trim-
bach and Trimbach, as well as the Congressional report, linked AIM to a vast conspiracy 
of other leftist organizations and emerging communist regimes that have infiltrated the 
United States, including “foreign ties, direct and indirect—with Castro, with China, with 
the IRA, with the Palestine Liberation Organization . . . the Weather Underground, the 
Communist Party, the Trotskyists, the Symbionese Liberation Army, the Black Panther 
Party . . .” (12). This argument flattened the wide tactical and political differences between 
each organization, reducing all radical activity as commensurate and analytically indistin-
guishable. Revolutionary activity of any kind, from AIM to the PLO, could easily be cate-
gorized under an empty signifier of communism. By blurring important distinctions 
between the goals of each organization listed above, AIM could be more easily categorized 
as a simple and familiar yet dangerous enemy. AIM is often mentioned among a laundry 
list of explicitly Marxist-Leninist organizations in ways the suggested connections by in-
nuendo. In the FBI’s Domestic Terrorist Digest, AIM is mention in the same breath as that 
Puerto Rican Independence Movement and the Weather Underground as one of three or-
ganizations mobilizing against America’s bicentennial celebration. The Digest suggest that 
AIM was organizing to “‘blow out the candles’ on America’s birthday cake” along with 
“the Weather Underground to ‘bring the fireworks,’” and that “the possibility of Puerto 
Rican independence groups engaging in terrorist activity exists” (1). While AIM was not 
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directly linked to Marx-Leninism, the evidence for the Puerto Rican Independence Move-
ment is strongly foregrounded in the Digest, suggesting some connection. The inference in 
this document is that these organizations were working together to coordinate attacks for 
presumably the same reasons. 
The strategic ambiguity of the FBI’s assertion makes it reasonable to conclude that be-
cause they share similar anti-American and anti-imperial sentiments that they could be 
categorized under a master signifier of communism or Marx-Leninism. As a rhetorical 
strategy, ambiguity and equivocation create identification and unity between disparate 
and singular elements. In the case of AIM, the ambiguity between elements aggregates 
enemies under the single sign of communism. Ambiguity enables renaming by a process 
of association and disassociation, in which as Kenneth Burke argues one (1973, 174) “throws 
something out by one name and brings it back by another name.” Simultaneously, this 
strategy also creates identification among those in dialectical opposition to either com-
munism or any of the radical groups associated with AIM. Put differently, this rhetorical 
strategy defines Americans as unified by what they are not. The rhetoric of enemy creation 
produces homogeneity within opposing forces. Sonja Foss, Karen Foss, and Robert Trapp 
argue that such rhetoric enables (2002, 192) “the creation of identification among opposing 
entities on the basis of a common enemy.” For the FBI, communism was the most sinister 
homogenous category available to describe seemingly un-American activity. The differ-
ences among radical protest organizations were flattened to create a common enemy that 
desired social disintegration and an end to the American way of life. The ever-present and 
ubiquitous nature of the threat, as one organization with many faces, justified swift and 
extreme action. The FBI represented the revolution as imminent and life threatening. Agent 
Durham contends that “The leaders have repeatedly predicted revolution . . . They must 
be stopped!” (9). 
 
AIM as Viet Cong 
 
AIM’s militancy was met with equal and opposite resistance. The FBI approached AIM as 
a guerilla or domestic terrorist organization that harbored intentions to kill in support of 
their objectives. As reflected in the testimony of agent Durham, AIM was “dedicated to the 
overthrow of our Government” and “they have been engaged in or planned every type of 
action model program—known to terrorist guerrillas today and have used the ‘propa-
ganda of the deed’ so successfully that some of the national media have discussed publicly 
their expertise in this endeavor” (4–5). Throughout their criminal investigations of AIM 
members and their standoff at Wounded Knee, the FBI invoked metaphors of insurgency 
and military jargon in their internal documents and press releases. There were three im-
portant consequences to the FBI’s rhetorical approach to insurgency. First, it reflected a 
misunderstanding of AIM’s revival of the warrior tradition as a mode of activism based on 
community building through self-sacrifice as opposed to guerrilla bravado. Second, the 
metaphors of guerrilla warfare helped reenact a familiar scene of counterinsurgency, 
drawing from available interpretations of the changing nature of warfare both domesti-
cally and abroad in Vietnam. Feeling they were facing an insurgent force, the FBI deployed 
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techniques of counterinsurgency, including infiltration of the organization, aggressive in-
vestigations to disrupt AIM’s activist networks, and counter-propaganda in press releases 
and media reports to inoculate Indian civilians against AIM’s message and diffuse poten-
tial sympathy in the non-Indian public. Finally, the application of such guerrilla warfare 
metaphors demonstrates the inner workings of the migrating concept of savagery across 
contexts of insurgency to justify extreme measures in defense of civilization. 
First, the FBI confused AIM’s warrior persona as guerrilla insurgency. Vast cultural dif-
ferences between Indian and non-Indian culture resulted in what Deloria calls “re-Indian-
ization,” or white culture’s divergent interpretation of Indian efforts to recover a romantic 
past (1971, 92). AIM’s tactic of occupation or land reclamation was a highly militant and 
symbolic act that reflected a historical warrior tradition practiced by American Indians in 
resistance to westward expansion in the nineteenth century. National Indian Youth Coun-
cil cofounded, Mel Thorn argued at the dawn of Indian activism in the 1960s that “There 
was ‘a new Indian’ war” (quoted in Steiner 1968, 27). Stan Steiner, who closely chronicled 
the rise of the Indian movement, elaborates as follows (1968, 27): “It fittingly had begun 
with the return of the warriors from ‘The War of the Whites.’ It was these warriors, dis-
guised in their khaki fatigues, who had gone back to the villages of their forefathers from 
the alien and urban battlefields.” The concept that the Indian wars of the nineteenth cen-
tury were ongoing was a common metaphor used to shock Indians out of apathy. Thorn 
contends that “The weakest link in the Indian’s defense is his lack of understanding of this 
modern-type war. Indians have not been able to use political action, propaganda, and 
power as well as their opponents” (quoted in Steiner 1968, 43). Thorn explains that by mo-
dem warfare, he meant a transformation of warfare from direct military violence to the 
seemingly benevolent practices of the Bureau of Indian Affairs. For Thorn and other 
emerging Indian activists such as Clyde Warrior, Richard Oakes, Russell Means, and Den-
nis Banks, the modern assault against Indians was direct against community solidarity and 
identity through practices such as “termination,” which sought to sever the federal gov-
ernment’s trust relationship with Indian nations and “relocation,” which lured Indians off 
reservations in promise of employment and assimilation. While the younger generation of 
Indian activists did not rule out the use of violence, their concept of warfare was based on 
defending and building Indian communities against assimilation and other practices that 
undermined self-determination. The new generation of 1960s Indian activists was inter-
ested in alternatives to political reformism as opposed to the empirically losing proposition 
of direct military conflict against the federal government. 
Occupation was a fitting practice given the movement’s disillusion with the political 
process, and even conventional social protest, to obtain self-determination. Sioux activist 
Dick McKenzie captured the new radical thinking and alienation that then dominated the 
consciousness of young Indian militants when he argued that “Kneel-Ins, Sit-Ins, Sleep-
Ins, Eat-Ins, Pray-Ins, like the Negroes do won’t help us. We would have to occupy the 
government buildings before things would change” (quoted in Steiner 1968, 45). While 
critical of the movement’s inability to leverage the necessary legal arguments to justify the 
tactic, Deloria argues that occupations could have been used “as a symbolic and political 
expression of the more general problem of instituting a program of land restoration by the 
federal government” (1974, 38). As a result, Deloria suggests that occupations created 
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fierce resistance to Indian militancy, thus, “try as they might, Indians could not convince 
the non-Indians of the logic or historical validity of their ideas” (1974, 24). The revival of 
what Thorn called a warrior tradition of resistance was mysterious and threatening to a 
non-Indian audience. Several rhetorical critics who analyze the American Indian Move-
ment argue that contemporary non-Indian society had no frame of reference to interpret 
their militant message. Sanchez and Stuckey argue that AIM activists had to overwhelm 
the (2000, 126) “preconceived, stereotypical, and/or negative images concerning what it 
meant to be ‘American Indian.’” Richard Morris and Philip Wander argue that Euro-Americans 
fundamental misunderstanding of Indian experiences, cultures, and histories made it 
(1990, 166) “virtually impossible for them to achieve self-determination or establish a firm 
foundation for communicating with the dominant society.” 
Infamous activist Leonard Peltier argues that non-Indian audiences did not understand 
the warrior tradition adopted by AIM: “We have to really start doing stuff: build commu-
nity gardens, chop wood, hauling water. Whatever they needed doing because that’s what 
your responsibility is. Not just prancing around with a gun in your hand and thinking 
you’re showing everybody you’re tough. In our society that’s not a warrior role” (quoted 
in Incident at Oglala 1992). In his introductory history to the American Indian Movement, 
Jeremy Schneider (1976) contends that AIM members understood warriorism as a dedica-
tion of self-sacrifice for the community. While AIM constructed a pan-Indian ethos, their 
uptake of a generic warriorism reflected a strong Sioux presence. The rhetorical influence 
of Sioux, and other traditional warrior cultures, explains the movement’s heavy reliance 
on the imagery of famous warriors such as Geronimo, Red Cloud, Crazy Horse, and Sitting 
Bull as a source of mobilization. Troy Johnson, Duane Champagne, and Joane Nagel ex-
plain that the movement (1997, 19) “drew selectively on many elements of Indian history, 
especially symbols of resistance.” Warriorism was mobilized by AIM leaders as a way to 
reconnect American Indians with a rich cultural history of resistance and survival. While I 
do not suggest that AIM was a pacifist victim of government repression, I argue that the 
cultural gap between Indian and non-Indian interpretations of the warrior tradition, along-
side predominant discourses that linked militant self-determination to guerrilla warfare, 
rationalized interpretations of AIM as insurgents. While it is certainly the case that occu-
pation was a confrontational and sometimes violent activity, AIM members contended that 
the warrior’s primary role was to build and defend their community. Warriorism, how-
ever, was interpreted as either a primitive attachment to a romantic past or a violent call 
to arms. Deloria argues that the problem of warriorism, for AIM and Sioux culture alike, 
was that non-Indian audience lacked the proper lens through which to distinguish be-
tween the civilian and military role of the warrior. Deloria contends that “the fairly re-
spectable thesis of past exploits in war, perhaps romanticized for morale purposes, became 
a demonic spiritual force all its own.” (1971 , 91). While Indians recovered a romantic past, 
non-Indians audience redefined Indians “in terms that white men will accept, even if that 
means re-Indianizing them according to white man’s idea of what they were like in the 
past and should logically become in the future” (1971, 92). For non-Indians, the concept of 
Indians “on the warpath” conjured up cultural images of tribal warriors raiding caravans 
and fighting the US cavalry. Even worse, the only contemporary analogue of warrior cul-
ture in which warfare served a civilian and military function emanated from the US war 
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in Vietnam and the insurgent practices of the Viet Cong. The FBI argued that AIM’s war-
rior culture was a cover from crime and terrorism. Trimbach and Trimbach’s most recent 
expose articulates the FBI’s perception of the rhetoric of resistance as a diversionary tactic 
from a violent criminal conspiracy. They argue that “invoking familiar themes of warrior 
bravery versus government oppression became a very effective means of diversion from 
matters of criminality” (7). 
Second, with a belief they were in a guerrilla conflict situation, the FBI approached pros-
ecuting the movement by the same rules of engagement as counterinsurgency. In their 
tactical response to the occupation of Wounded Knee, South Dakota, the FBI, aided by 
news media covering of the event, reenacted an insurgency-counterinsurgency dialectic to 
interpret AIM’s confrontational politics. While they may have had the best intentions, the 
overwhelming display of law enforcement and military equipment throughout the occu-
pation suggests a heightened and perhaps exaggerated threat perception on behalf of the 
FBI. The occupation of Wounded Knee began as a conflict between AIM affiliated tradi-
tionalists and the more conservative Oglala tribal government in early 1973. AIM had as-
sembled at Pine Ridge to assist tribal members alleging corruption on the part of tribal 
chairman Richard Wilson. Residents alleged that in addition to embezzling tribal funds, 
Wilson was pliable to financial incentives from energy corporations interested in non-
petroleum energy resources including coal and uranium (Messerschmidt, 1983). In re-
sponse to a growing AIM presence at Pine Ridge, Wilson asked for and received assistance 
from federal marshals, the FBI, and the BIA to contain an impending showdown. In an act 
of protest, a large group of AIM members and reservation residents held a press conference 
at the historic site of the 1890 Wounded Knee massacre. On 27 February 1973, Wilson’s 
personal security force (Guardians of the Oglala Nation), the FBI, the BIA, federal mar-
shals, and other local law enforcement blockaded the group, marking the start of a four-
month standoff at Wounded Knee. At the initial assembly at Calico Hall precipitating the 
blockade, Russell Means issued a defiant message to law enforcement: “The only two op-
tions open to the United State of American are (1) They wipe out the old people, women, 
children, and men, by shooting and attacking us. (2) They can negotiate our demands” 
(quoted in Akwesasne Notes 1974, 35). While the occupation may have been unforeseen, 
AIM members decided to stand their ground and occupy the hallowed site in defiance. 
The resulting 71-day standoff between AIM and law enforcement was a spectacle with 
corresponding displays of military force by both the FBI and AIM. During the occupation 
both sides exchanged gunfire resulting in the death of two AIM occupants and injuries to 
law enforcement, the occupants, and members of the local community. While AIM mem-
bers possessed a cache of weapons to hold their ground, the corresponding display of force 
by law enforcement was spectacular. John Williams Sayer (1997), fellow at the Institute of 
Legal Studies, offers evidence of the amount weaponry involved, including military sup-
plies (1997, 146): 
 
The equipment maintained by the military while in use during the siege included 
fifteen armored personal carriers, clothing, rifles, grenade launchers, flares, and 
133,000 rounds of ammunition, for a total cost, including the use of maintenance 
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personnel from the national guard of five states and pilot and planes for aerial 
photographs, of over half a million dollars. 
 
In addition, journalist Steve Hendricks (2006) argues that armored personnel carriers and 
other equipment designed for use in combat, including two Air Force Phantom jets and 
three helicopters, were used throughout the siege (132–133). In an unfortunate connection, 
the same types of jets were used in combat missions in Vietnam. Hendricks, relying on 
Senate testimony, argues that Army Vice Chief of Staff Alexander Haig ordered military 
advisers to oversee the transfer of military equipment, train federal marshals to use gre-
nade launchers, and oversee military protocol and rules of engagement with the occupants. 
While Smith and Warrior concur that there is strong evidence of indirect military involve-
ment, they conclude it was more of a reactionary fear of violence than any sort of vast 
government conspiracy assert by AIM members with “fondness for rhetorical excess and 
an exaggerated sense of self-importance” (212–213). In fact, the military’s presence may 
have restrained law enforcement given that a Pentagon memorandum argues that “the 
seizure and holding of Wounded Knee poses no threat to the Nation” (Smith and Warrior 
1996, 213).1 Notwithstanding the restraint and professionalism of military advisers, the in-
troduction of military props and staging of combat scenery at Wounded Knee contributed 
to a counterinsurgency framework in which it would have been reasonable, however dis-
torted, for law enforcement agents to believe they were involved in a guerrilla conflict. An 
FBI teletype issued on 24 April 1975, comments on “the use of FBI, US Marshals and Bureau 
of Indian Affairs (BIA) Police at Wounded Knee, South Dakota, during the period February 
27–May 8, 1973, in a paramilitary law enforcement situation” (Churchill and Vander Wall 
1990, 250).2 The teletype also identifies problems “in adapting to a paramilitary role” when 
confronting AIM at Wounded Knee (252). The document goes on to detail the military 
training and equipment provided to the FBI by the US military including “Armored per-
sonnel carriers, M-16’s, automatic infantry weapons, chemical weapons, steel helmets, gas 
masks, body armor, illuminating flares, military clothing and rations” (ibid.). In light of 
such preparations, the FBI made adjustments to a new framework of de facto military 
counterinsurgency as opposed to law enforcement. The teletype in question also notes the 
need to make the military preparations less visible because “the use of Army troops against 
these Indians might be misinterpreted by the press” (ibid.). For the bureau, it was im-
portant to match the fire power of the “militants were in possession of an M-60 machine 
gun and AK-47s (Communist automatic assault rifles) which could result in heavy casual-
ties” (253). The nature of the FBI changed after Wounded Knee due to the type of training 
required to deal with similar insurgent situations. Trimbach and Trimbach reflect that “As 
much as the AIM leadership detested the FBI, they might have liked even less the idea that 
Wounded Knee spawned a whole new role for the Bureau” (2007, 272). 
This context frames the FBI’s use of propaganda, informants, and agent provocateurs to 
win the hearts and minds of the Indian and non-Indian public as they made preparations 
to disrupt AIM’s operations. Starting at Wounded Knee through the trial of Leonard Pel-
tier, the FBI created strong ties to the national press to counter media savvy AIM celebrities 
such as Russell Means. Trimbach and Trimbach argue that the bureau felt as if they had to 
recover their reputations against the force of the alleged “AIM/Media spin machine” (14). 
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During the Wounded Knee stand-off, an FBI teletype reveals that the FBI altered the re-
ports of KIXI radio reporter Clarence Daniels without his knowledge. An FBI teletype reads 
that McDaniels was “unaware that his stories are not being publicized in full or that the 
intelligence information and his tapes are being furnished [by] the FBI” (Churchill and 
Vander Wall 1990, 247).3 US Marshals also successfully infiltrated the Wounded Knee oc-
cupant force by sending in a female agent disguised as a reporter (Burnette and Koster 
1974, 58). For security reasons, the FBI restricted media access to blockaded areas, forcing 
reporters to rely on sources within the bureau. The FBI offered afternoon press releases 
about the occupation in Pine Ridge village that was miles from the occupation site. FBI-
generated press releases were the primary source of information for the public throughout 
the occupation, and they generally reflected the FBI’s narrative about the events. 
Third, the rhetoric of wartime savagery associated with insurgency and terrorism was 
used to describe AIM’s occupation of Wounded Knee in 1973 through the trail of Leonard 
Peltier in 1976. As it had within other wartime contexts, the rhetoric served as a justification 
for extreme measures against the enemy. The FBI press releases described the AIM’s facil-
ities, whether houses, tents, or run-down shacks as a “sophisticated bunker complex” mas-
querading as civilian targets.4 A memorandum titled “Law Enforcement on the Pine Ridge 
Reservation” argued that on Pine Ridge 
 
There are pockets of Indian population which consist almost exclusively of Amer-
ican Indian Movement (AIM) members and their supporters on the Reservation. 
It is significant that in some of these AIM centers the residents have built bunkers 
which would literally require military assault forces if it were necessary to over-
come resistance emanating from the bunkers.”5 
 
The implication was that modest and disheveled rural homes and shacks were actually 
disguised military installations. Furthermore, using military responses were rationalized 
as an extreme, but perhaps necessary tactic if AIM provoked the FBI. Insurgents are bar-
baric because they do not obey the rules of engagement of civilized conflict. They use ci-
vilians as currency for partisan military resistance. A key component of insurgent warfare 
is that its participants blur the lines between civilian and military targets by hiding in 
seemingly innocuous places. Insurgents rely on the support of local communities to pro-
vide them with the necessary supplies to continue their resistance. In instances where it is 
not given freely by the community, the insurgent force holds to community hostage. While 
Pine Ridge was one of the poorest communities in America, the recent military experience 
in Vietnam demonstrated that in spite of a community’s humble or bucolic exterior, para-
military activity could be proceeding unnoticed. Trimbach and Trimbach argue that some 
of the agents deployed to Wounded Knee were well adapted to “their new role as sentries” 
because of their experience in Vietnam “helped to supply badly needed tactical operations 
knowledge” (105). The war-time imagery was not lost on the agents. The FBI’s military 
framing justified the use of force against what may otherwise be interpreted as innocent 
civilian targets typically exempted from the rules of civilized conventional combat. 
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Corresponding images of savagery interpenetrated both American Indians and the Viet 
Cong. Savagery is a dialectical discourse, historically marshaled in defense of colonial am-
bitions and the expansion of Western civilization. The roots of savagery can be traced to 
initial European contact with American Indians in which the values of civilization were 
affirmed through conquest of savagery. Fergus Borderwich argues that (1996, 18) “in their 
apparent savagery, Indians dramatically underscored Euro-Americans’ notions of civiliza-
tion, while their repeated military defeats seem unchallengeable proof of the white man’s 
technological and moral superiority.” Robert Berkhofer (1978) argues that the presumption 
in Western culture of a uniform savagery, or a condition of arrested human development, 
gave rise to and vindicated teleological beliefs about the triumph and superiority of West-
ern culture. The image of the frontier was the most important site at which savagery was 
transformed into civilization, a universal and teleological project of Westernization. The 
intellectual and cultural imagery of the frontier myth is thus a migratory and ubiquitous 
discourse tied to overcoming savagery. 
In the context of Vietnam, Ivie argues that administration officials relied on topoi of 
savagery “to construct the image indirectly through contrasting references to the adver-
sary’s coercive, irrational, and aggressive attempts to subjugate a freedom-loving, rational, 
and pacific victim” (1980, 284). The North Vietnamese were constructed as uninvited out-
side aggressors, committed to ideological uniformity, and savage acts of brutality and ter-
rorism (Ivie 1987; Ivie 2005). While the image of savagery authorized some soldiers to 
psychologically distance themselves from atrocities committed against their Vietnamese 
enemy, the mirror image of the Viet Cong reflected back to American guerrillas in order to 
rationalize counterinsurgent responses to Indian militancy. Concomitant with law enforce-
ments use of war-time imagery, the Vietnam metaphor did not go unnoticed by the occu-
pants of Wounded Knee. In his book Viet Cong at Wounded Knee, Blackfoot activist and AIM 
member Woody Kipp (2004) argues that his experience at Wounded Knee reminded him 
of his own tour in Vietnam. Kipp argues that many Indian soldiers empathized with the 
Vietnamese because their “physical resemblance to the Vietnamese people” (35). He argues 
that later, during a gunfire exchange at Wounded Knee, while illuminated by military 
flares that he “realized the United States military was looking for me with those flares. I 
was the gook now” (126). Whether the connection is literal or figurative , intentional or 
accidental, AIM was constructed with a similar lexicon to the Viet Cong. As Kipp argues, 
the Viet Cong and AIM were mirror reflections of one another. The circulating image of 
the Viet Cong, and that of Indian savagery, provided the rhetorical resources for the FBI 
to construct and comprehend the actions of AIM. 
Like the Viet Cong, AIM was argued to use Indian civilians as diversions, human 
shields, or conduits, willing or unwilling, for sustained warfare. The enemy hid their 
weapon caches in innocuous civilian spaces without concern for the danger posed to the 
community. A 2 February 1976 memorandum argues that AIM was “by force of arms tak-
ing a number of community residents as hostages” (Churchill and Vander Wall 1990, 264).6 
Agent Durham argues that (4) “they have trampled the civil rights of Indians . . . citizens 
in the country” and that they had imposed a new form of imperialism on Indian Country 
(8) “utilized to justify revolution and, in many cases, terrorism.” As outside agitators, AIM 
had allegedly distorted the will of the Indian people that had once authorized them to 
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agitate on their behalf. They used the community to further their own revolutionary goals. 
The idea that AIM is an outside agitator justified the FBI’s presence at Pine Ridge as a way 
to liberate the local residents. Trimbach and Trimbach argue that AIM’s presence was un-
invited and that “to most law-abiding Native Americans, however, the FBI was the only 
reason there were not more AIM-involved assaults and murders” (9). For the FBI, AIM 
guerrilla warriors were willing to sacrifice the people they were supposedly liberating to 
further their violent objectives. 
In addition to savagery and a callous concern for human life, it was important for the 
FBI to demonstrate the AIM guerrilla warriors were well-armed and poised to strike. A 
4 May 1973 teletype argues the Wounded Knee occupants were looking to purchase “au-
tomatic weapons, bazookas, rocket launchers, hand grenades, land mines, and mortars” 
(Churchill and Vander Wall 1990, 257).7 When a Boston-based support group airlifted food 
and other supplies to the occupants, the FBI told the news media they had found “arms 
and ammunition” of which no evidence existed in the flight manifest (Zimmerman 1976). 
Like the Viet Cong funneling weapons through civilian surrogates, AIM was using hu-
manitarian and philanthropic sources to conceal their guerrilla preparations. Sayer argues 
that during the trials of Dennis Banks and Russell Means for their part in the Wounded 
Knee occupation, the government described them as “renegades” and “insurgents” that 
did not speak on behalf of their people but rather their own political agenda (1997, 4). 
Durham testified before Congress that Banks and Means planned and engaged in terrorist 
and guerilla activity that were “extremely violent and well funded”(United States 1976, 5). 
During the trial of AIM members Bob Robideau and Dino Butler for murder of two FBI 
agents in 1975 (later linked to Peltier in 1977) an FBI teletype warns of advanced guerrilla 
training. The document argues that a group of nearly 2,000 Dog Soldiers “who are Pro–
American Indian Movement (AIM) members who will kill for advancement of AIM objec-
tives, have been seen since the Wounded Knee, South Dakota [sic] . . . These Dog Soldiers 
allegedly are undergoing guerrilla warfare training experiences” (Churchill and Vander 
Wall 1990, 278).8 The teletype even suggests the revival of nineteenth-century Indian war-
fare in acts such as “sniping of tourists on interstate highways in South Dakota” and “‘burn 
farmers’ and shooting equipment” to be committed by Russell Means “Hit Men” (279). 
This language “reindianizes” AIM as nineteenth-century warriors that circle and attack 
innocent wagon caravans as they cross the Great Plains. While such rhetoric invokes fear 
and terror, it also revives a type of tragic yet romantic savagery that, as Deloria argues is a 
by-product (1971, 91) “of the failure of a warrior people to become domesticated.” The 
separation of caricatures of civilized “law-abiding Indians” from the radical warriors hold-
ing onto an archaic and violent past highlighted the ongoing presence of savagery in In-
dian Country. The law-abiding Indians have assimilated and rationally embraced the 
tenets of Euro-American society while AIM mocks society’s laws and terrorizes those that 
desire the presence of civilization. While the FBI may have been unaware of their historical 
troubled language to describe what they considered a very real Indian threat, they partic-
ipated in the rhetoric of savagery that has been traditionally marshaled as a justification 
for war from Western expansion in North America through the war in Vietnam. Given the 
movement’s conception of Western history, it is not surprising that many Indian activists 
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did not greet the FBI as liberators. Suspicion of law enforcement and the US military per-
vaded Indian Country. Many activists that had been shaped by their experience in Vietnam 
identified much more with their Vietnamese enemy then their fellow soldiers. Conversely, 
the FBI had been affected by experiences and imagery of Vietnam. For them, the lesson 
was that the conditions of modem warfare had become blurred and unconventional. They 
needed to adapt to their new role to carry out their mission. Whether the threat of AIM 
was real or perceived, the rhetoric of guerrilla warfare and its attendant savagery were the 
only available topoi for which the FBI to conceive of AIM and emergence of domestic rad-
icalism. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Agents Trimbach and Trimbach ultimately argue that there was little the FBI could do to 
save the residents of Pine Ridge, South Dakota. The agents make an ambivalent and haunt-
ing statement about losing the soul of Indian country to AIM (2007, 272): 
 
No one wanted to admit it but, in the final analysis, the AIM leadership, not Jus-
tice Department officials, ran the show at Wounded Knee. And in a case of su-
preme irony, we had allowed the slow destruction of the village to unfold before 
our eyes. It may sound like an old Viet Nam era cliché, but in order to “save the 
village,” the government had to let it be destroyed, house by house. 
 
In an unfortunate choice of words, the agents reflect on an irony of the Vietnam War as 
applied to Indian Country. Upon the destruction the village of Ben Tre, journalist Peter 
Arnett relayed an infamous and iconic quote from an unnamed officer arguing that “it 
became necessary to destroy the village in order to save it” (quoted in Martin 2006, 15). 
From the FBI’s perspective, the savagery of unconventional warfare that had migrated 
from foreign contexts left them with little option but to respond in kind to contain what 
they considered to be one of the most dangerous threats of their time. As the argument 
goes, the reckless actions of AIM forced the FBI to reluctantly make unsavory calculations 
to act in what they considered to be the best interests of the people of Indian Country and 
the nation as a whole. 
While this essay has been highly critical of the FBI’s repression of AIM, I suggest neither 
malicious intent nor a vast conspiracy against AIM. While Trimbach and Trimbach sug-
gest, their reputations have been dragged through the mud by liberal activists and oppor-
tunistic academics, their history of AIM is not sacrosanct, nor are their tactics beyond 
criticism. It may be the case that the Bureau had the best intentions, and its agents were 
good people. This essay, however, demonstrates the limitations of the FBI’s rhetoric to ra-
tionalize AIM’s activity as anything other than a communist conspiracy of guerrilla warri-
ors. The FBI had a constrained cultural field from which to make threat assessments about 
AIM. The omnipresence of topoi concerning the chameleon of communist aggression from 
the Soviet Union to Vietnam, the blurred nature of unconventional warfare, the rise of rad-
ical domestic protest organizations, and cultural mythology about American Indians, cre-
ated a limited rhetorical field for those charged with countering such threats. With limited 
K E L L Y ,  A D V A N C E S  I N  T H E  H I S T O R Y  O F  R H E T O R I C  1 0  (2 0 0 7 )  
23 
resources of invention, the FBI constructed AIM as a savage criminal syndicate embodying 
an amalgam of the worst traits of America’s enemies: communists, terrorists, Viet Cong, 
and other revolutionaries. The rhetoric suggests that the FBI believed they were involved 
in an insurgent-counterinsurgent framework. As a result, they used methods of counter-
insurgency, the rhetorical dimension of which justified extreme responses to AIM. The 
FBI’s response to AIM illuminates the features of rhetorical counterinsurgency: a technique 
of governance that utilizes public communication strategies and rhetorical venues to con-
trol the available interpretations of the social order. The collection of intelligence infor-
mation, the use of agent provocateurs, close ties to the national press, the public 
performance of justified force, and the use of available topoi of savagery to interpret social 
unrest, worked synergistically to contain AIM. In the end, however, the FBI’s wild fanta-
sies of AIM revolution never came to pass. Simultaneously, AIM was unable to achieve 
any of their twenty-point demands expressed during the Trail of Broken Treaties. While it 
may have been that AIM was unable to craft a palatable message to achieve their political 
goals, there were factors beyond their control that limited the reception of any radical po-
litical message. Material and rhetorical constraints doomed AIM’s warrior culture to be 
approached with fear and misunderstanding. The FBI’s investigation of AIM demonstrates 
the ambivalent position of Indians in America. To agitate for the political changes required 
for real justice, the return of ancestral lands stolen by a settler nation would require the 
radical upending of the existing political order and a massive redistribution of natural re-
sources and land that would be unacceptable in even the most favorable political climates. 
The perceived line between agitation and insurgency is much thinner than we may realize. 
The most haunting conclusion critics can draw from the FBI’s rhetoric is that if one insists 
they are in a war, they are. 
 
Notes 
 
1. See also Norman Kempster, “Military Ran the Show, Restrained FBI at Wounded Knee 
Siege,” Washington Star, 1 December 1975, A1. 
2. FBI teletype, “The Use of Special Agents of the FBI in a Paramilitary Law Enforcement Op-
eration in the Indian Country,” 24 April 1975, reprinted in facsimile by Churchill and 
Vander Wall (1990, 250–53). 
3. Excerpt (title and date omitted) from FBI teletype, reprinted in facsimile by Churchill and 
Vander Wall (1990, 247). 
4. Tom Coll quoted in John Crewdson, “Two FBI Men Die, Indian Slain,” New York Times, 27 
June 1975, p. 1. 
5. FBI memorandum. “Law Enforcement on the Pine Ridge Indian Reservation,” 6 June 1975, 
quoted in Churchill and Vander Wall (1990, 263, 265). 
6. FBI memorandum, “To: Director, FBI,” 6 February 1976, reprinted in facsimile by Churchill 
and Vander Wall (1990, 264). The title of the memorandum was redacted. 
7. FBI memorandum, “To Acting Director: American Indian Movement,” 4 May 1973, re-
printed in facsimile by Churchill and Vander Wall (1990, 257–59). The teletype alleges that 
money donated from entertainer Sammy Davis Jr. may be used to purchase advanced wea-
ponry to use against the FBI. 
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8. FBI teletype, “American Indian Movement,” 21 May 1976, reprinted in facsimile by Church-
ill and Vander Wall (1990, 277–80). 
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